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Abstract
In collaborative planning activities, since
the agents are autonomous and heteroge-
neous, it is inevitable that conflicts arise in
their beliefs during the planning process.
In cases where such conflicts are relevant
to the task at hand, the agents should en-
gage in collaborative negotiation as an at-
tempt to square away the discrepancies in
their beliefs. This paper presents a com-
putational strategy for detecting conflicts
regarding proposed beliefs and for engag-
ing in collaborative negotiation to resolve
the conflicts that warrant resolution. Our
model is capable of selecting the most ef-
fective aspect to address in its pursuit of
conflict resolution in cases where multiple
conflicts arise, and of selecting appropriate
evidence to justify the need for such mod-
ification. Furthermore, by capturing the
negotiation process in a recursive Propose-
Evaluate-Modify cycle of actions, our model
can successfully handle embedded negotia-
tion subdialogues.
1 Introduction
In collaborative consultation dialogues, the consul-
tant and the executing agent collaborate on develop-
ing a plan to achieve the executing agent’s domain
goal. Since agents are autonomous and heteroge-
neous, it is inevitable that conflicts in their beliefs
arise during the planning process. In such cases,
collaborative agents should attempt to square away
(Joshi, 1982) the conflicts by engaging in collabora-
tive negotiation to determine what should constitute
their shared plan of actions and shared beliefs. Col-
laborative negotiation differs from non-collaborative
∗This material is based upon work supported by the
National Science Foundation under Grant No. IRI-
9122026.
negotiation and argumentation mainly in the atti-
tude of the participants, since collaborative agents
are not self-centered, but act in a way as to benefit
the agents as a group. Thus, when facing a conflict,
a collaborative agent should not automatically reject
a belief with which she does not agree; instead, she
should evaluate the belief and the evidence provided
to her and adopt the belief if the evidence is convinc-
ing. On the other hand, if the evaluation indicates
that the agent should maintain her original belief,
she should attempt to provide sufficient justification
to convince the other agent to adopt this belief if the
belief is relevant to the task at hand.
This paper presents a model for engaging in col-
laborative negotiation to resolve conflicts in agents’
beliefs about domain knowledge. Our model 1) de-
tects conflicts in beliefs and initiates a negotiation
subdialogue only when the conflict is relevant to the
current task, 2) selects the most effective aspect to
address in its pursuit of conflict resolution when mul-
tiple conflicts exist, 3) selects appropriate evidence
to justify the system’s proposed modification of the
user’s beliefs, and 4) captures the negotiation pro-
cess in a recursive Propose-Evaluate-Modify cycle of
actions, thus enabling the system to handle embed-
ded negotiation subdialogues.
2 Related Work
Researchers have studied the analysis and genera-
tion of arguments (Birnbaum et al., 1980; Reich-
man, 1981; Cohen, 1987; Sycara, 1989; Quilici, 1992;
Maybury, 1993); however, agents engaging in ar-
gumentative dialogues are solely interested in win-
ning an argument and thus exhibit different behav-
ior from collaborative agents. Sidner (1992; 1994)
formulated an artificial language for modeling col-
laborative discourse using proposal/acceptance and
proposal/rejection sequences; however, her work is
descriptive and does not specify response generation
strategies for agents involved in collaborative inter-
actions.
Webber and Joshi (1982) have noted the impor-
tance of a cooperative system providing support for
its responses. They identified strategies that a sys-
tem can adopt in justifying its beliefs; however, they
did not specify the criteria under which each of these
strategies should be selected. Walker (1994) de-
scribed a method of determining when to include
optional warrants to justify a claim based on factors
such as communication cost, inference cost, and cost
of memory retrieval. However, her model focuses
on determining when to include informationally re-
dundant utterances, whereas our model determines
whether or not justification is needed for a claim
to be convincing and, if so, selects appropriate ev-
idence from the system’s private beliefs to support
the claim.
Caswey et al. (Cawsey et al., 1993; Logan et
al., 1994) introduced the idea of utilizing a be-
lief revision mechanism (Galliers, 1992) to predict
whether a set of evidence is sufficient to change a
user’s existing belief and to generate responses for
information retrieval dialogues in a library domain.
They argued that in the library dialogues they ana-
lyzed, “in no cases does negotiation extend beyond
the initial belief conflict and its immediate resolu-
tion.” (Logan et al., 1994, page 141). However,
our analysis of naturally-occurring consultation dia-
logues (Columbia University Transcripts, 1985; SRI
Transcripts, 1992) shows that in other domains con-
flict resolution does extend beyond a single exchange
of conflicting beliefs; therefore we employ a recur-
sive model for collaboration that captures extended
negotiation and represents the structure of the dis-
course. Furthermore, their system deals with a sin-
gle conflict, while our model selects a focus in its
pursuit of conflict resolution when multiple conflicts
arise. In addition, we provide a process for selecting
among multiple possible pieces of evidence.
3 Features of Collaborative
Negotiation
Collaborative negotiation occurs when conflicts arise
among agents developing a shared plan1 during col-
laborative planning. A collaborative agent is driven
by the goal of developing a plan that best satisfies
the interests of all the agents as a group, instead of
one that maximizes his own interest. This results
in several distinctive features of collaborative nego-
tiation: 1) A collaborative agent does not insist on
winning an argument, and may change his beliefs
1The notion of shared plan has been used in (Grosz
and Sidner, 1990; Allen, 1991).
if another agent presents convincing justification for
an opposing belief. This differentiates collaborative
negotiation from argumentation (Birnbaum et al.,
1980; Reichman, 1981; Cohen, 1987; Quilici, 1992).
2) Agents involved in collaborative negotiation are
open and honest with one another; they will not de-
liberately present false information to other agents,
present information in such a way as to mislead the
other agents, or strategically hold back information
from other agents for later use. This distinguishes
collaborative negotiation from non-collaborative ne-
gotiation such as labor negotiation (Sycara, 1989).
3) Collaborative agents are interested in others’ be-
liefs in order to decide whether to revise their own
beliefs so as to come to agreement (Chu-Carroll and
Carberry, 1995). Although agents involved in ar-
gumentation and non-collaborative negotiation take
other agents’ beliefs into consideration, they do so
mainly to find weak points in their opponents’ beliefs
and attack them to win the argument.
In our earlier work, we built on Sidner’s pro-
posal/acceptance and proposal/rejection sequences
(Sidner, 1994) and developed a model that cap-
tures collaborative planning processes in a Propose-
Evaluate-Modify cycle of actions (Chu-Carroll and
Carberry, 1994). This model views collaborative
planning as agent A proposing a set of actions and
beliefs to be incorporated into the shared plan being
developed, agent B evaluating the proposal to deter-
mine whether or not he accepts the proposal and,
if not, agent B proposing a set of modifications to
A’s original proposal. The proposed modifications
will again be evaluated by A, and if conflicts arise,
she may propose modifications to B’s previously pro-
posed modifications, resulting in a recursive process.
However, our research did not specify, in cases where
multiple conflicts arise, how an agent should identify
which part of an unaccepted proposal to address or
how to select evidence to support the proposed mod-
ification. This paper extends that work by incorpo-
rating into the modification process a strategy to
determine the aspect of the proposal that the agent
will address in her pursuit of conflict resolution, as
well as a means of selecting appropriate evidence to
justify the need for such modification.
4 Response Generation in
Collaborative Negotiation
In order to capture the agents’ intentions conveyed
by their utterances, our model of collaborative nego-
tiation utilizes an enhanced version of the dialogue
model described in (Lambert and Carberry, 1991)
to represent the current status of the interaction.
The enhanced dialogue model has four levels: the
domain level which consists of the domain plan be-
ing constructed for the user’s later execution, the
problem-solving level which contains the actions be-
ing performed to construct the domain plan, the be-
lief level which consists of the mutual beliefs pursued
during the planning process in order to further the
problem-solving intentions, and the discourse level
which contains the communicative actions initiated
to achieve the mutual beliefs (Chu-Carroll and Car-
berry, 1994). This paper focuses on the evaluation
and modification of proposed beliefs, and details a
strategy for engaging in collaborative negotiations.
4.1 Evaluating Proposed Beliefs
Our system maintains a set of beliefs about the do-
main and about the user’s beliefs. Associated with
each belief is a strength that represents the agent’s
confidence in holding that belief. We model the
strength of a belief using endorsements, which are
explicit records of factors that affect one’s certainty
in a hypothesis (Cohen, 1985), following (Galliers,
1992; Logan et al., 1994). Our endorsements are
based on the semantics of the utterance used to con-
vey a belief, the level of expertise of the agent con-
veying the belief, stereotypical knowledge, etc.
The belief level of the dialogue model consists of
mutual beliefs proposed by the agents’ discourse ac-
tions. When an agent proposes a new belief and
gives (optional) supporting evidence for it, this set
of proposed beliefs is represented as a belief tree,
where the belief represented by a child node is in-
tended to support that represented by its parent.
The root nodes of these belief trees (top-level be-
liefs) contribute to problem-solving actions and thus
affect the domain plan being developed. Given a set
of newly proposed beliefs, the system must decide
whether to accept the proposal or to initiate a nego-
tiation dialogue to resolve conflicts. The evaluation
of proposed beliefs starts at the leaf nodes of the pro-
posed belief trees since acceptance of a piece of pro-
posed evidence may affect acceptance of the parent
belief it is intended to support. The process contin-
ues until the top-level proposed beliefs are evaluated.
Conflict resolution strategies are invoked only if the
top-level proposed beliefs are not accepted because
if collaborative agents agree on a belief relevant to
the domain plan being constructed, it is irrelevant
whether they agree on the evidence for that belief
(Young et al., 1994).
In determining whether to accept a proposed be-
lief or evidential relationship, the evaluator first con-
structs an evidence set containing the system’s evi-
dence that supports or attacks bel and the evidence
accepted by the system that was proposed by the
user as support for bel. Each piece of evidence
contains a belief beli, and an evidential relation-
ship supports( beli, bel). Following Walker’s weak-
est link assumption (Walker, 1992) the strength of
the evidence is the weaker of the strength of the
belief and the strength of the evidential relation-
ship. The evaluator then employs a simplified ver-
sion of Galliers’ belief revision mechanism2 (Galliers,
1992; Logan et al., 1994) to compare the strengths of
the evidence that supports and attacks bel. If the
strength of one set of evidence strongly outweighs
that of the other, the decision to accept or reject
bel is easily made. However, if the difference in
their strengths does not exceed a pre-determined
threshold, the evaluator has insufficient informa-
tion to determine whether to adopt bel and there-
fore will initiate an information-sharing subdialogue
(Chu-Carroll and Carberry, 1995) to share informa-
tion with the user so that each of them can knowl-
edgably re-evaluate the user’s original proposal. If,
during information-sharing, the user provides con-
vincing support for a belief whose negation is held
by the system, the system may adopt the belief after
the re-evaluation process, thus resolving the conflict
without negotiation.
4.1.1 Example
To illustrate the evaluation of proposed beliefs,
consider the following utterances:
(1) S: I think Dr. Smith is teaching AI next
semester.
(2) U: Dr. Smith is not teaching AI.
(3) He is going on sabbatical next year.
Figure 1 shows the belief and discourse levels of
the dialogue model that captures utterances (2)
and (3). The belief evaluation process will start
with the belief at the leaf node of the proposed
belief tree, On-Sabbatical(Smith,next year)). The
system will first gather its evidence pertaining to
the belief, which includes 1) a warranted belief3
that Dr. Smith has postponed his sabbatical until
1997 (Postponed-Sabbatical(Smith,1997)), 2) a war-
ranted belief that Dr. Smith postponing his sabbat-
ical until 1997 supports the belief that he is not
going on sabbatical next year (supports(Postponed-
Sabbatical(Smith,1997), ¬On-Sabbatical(Smith,next
year)), 3) a strong belief that Dr. Smith will not
be a visitor at IBM next year (¬visitor(Smith,
2For details on how our model determines the accep-
tance of a belief using the ranking of endorsements pro-
posed by Galliers, see (Chu-Carroll, 1995).
3The strength of a belief is classified as: warranted,
strong, or weak, based on the endorsement of the belief.
MB(U,S,~Teaches(Smith,AI))
MB(U,S,On-Sabbatical(Smith,next year))
Inform(U,S,~Teaches(Smith,AI))
Address-AcceptanceTell(U,S,~Teaches(Smith,AI))
Inform(U,S,On-Sabbatical(Smith,next year))
Tell(U,S,On-Sabbatical(Smith,next year))
support
Proposed Belief Level
Discourse Level
Dr. Smith is not teaching AI.
Dr. Smith is going on sabbatical next year.
Figure 1: Belief and Discourse Levels for (2) and (3)
IBM, next year)), and 4) a warranted belief that
Dr. Smith not being a visitor at IBM next year
supports the belief that he is not going on sab-
batical next year (supports(¬visitor(Smith, IBM,
next year), ¬On-Sabbatical(Smith, next year)), per-
haps because Dr. Smith has expressed his desire to
spend his sabbatical only at IBM). The belief revi-
sion mechanism will then be invoked to determine
the system’s belief about On-Sabbatical(Smith, next
year) based on the system’s own evidence and the
user’s statement. Since beliefs (1) and (2) above
constitute a warranted piece of evidence against the
proposed belief and beliefs (3) and (4) constitute a
strong piece of evidence against it, the system will
not accept On-Sabbatical(Smith, next year).
The system believes that being on sabbatical im-
plies a faculty member is not teaching any courses;
thus the proposed evidential relationship will be ac-
cepted. However, the system will not accept the top-
level proposed belief, ¬Teaches(Smith, AI), since
the system has a prior belief to the contrary (as
expressed in utterance (1)) and the only evidence
provided by the user was an implication whose an-
tecedent was not accepted.
4.2 Modifying Unaccepted Proposals
The collaborative planning principle in (Whittaker
and Stenton, 1988; Walker, 1992) suggests that
“conversants must provide evidence of a detected
discrepancy in belief as soon as possible.” Thus,
once an agent detects a relevant conflict, she must
notify the other agent of the conflict and initiate a
negotiation subdialogue to resolve it — to do oth-
erwise is to fail in her responsibility as a collabo-
rative agent. We capture the attempt to resolve
a conflict with the problem-solving action Modify-
Proposal, whose goal is to modify the proposal to
a form that will potentially be accepted by both
agents. When applied to belief modification,Modify-
Proposal has two specializations: Correct-Node, for
when a proposed belief is not accepted, and Correct-
Relation, for when a proposed evidential relationship
is not accepted. Figure 2 shows the problem-solving
recipes4 for Correct-Node and its subaction, Modify-
Node, that is responsible for the actual modifica-
tion of the proposal. The applicability conditions5
of Correct-Node specify that the action can only be
invoked when s1 believes that node is not accept-
able while s2 believes that it is (when s1 and s2
disagree about the proposed belief represented by
node). However, since this is a collaborative in-
teraction, the actual modification can only be per-
formed when both s1 and s2 believe that node is
not acceptable — that is, the conflict between s1
and s2 must have been resolved. This is captured
by the applicability condition and precondition of
Modify-Node. The attempt to satisfy the precondi-
tion causes the system to post as a mutual belief
to be achieved the belief that node is not accept-
able, leading the system to adopt discourse actions
to change s2’s beliefs, thus initiating a collaborative
negotiation subdialogue.6
4.2.1 Selecting the Focus of Modification
When multiple conflicts arise between the system
and the user regarding the user’s proposal, the sys-
tem must identify the aspect of the proposal on
which it should focus in its pursuit of conflict reso-
lution. For example, in the case where Correct-Node
is selected as the specialization of Modify-Proposal,
the system must determine how the parameter node
in Correct-Node should be instantiated. The goal of
the modification process is to resolve the agents’ con-
flicts regarding the unaccepted top-level proposed
beliefs. For each such belief, the system could pro-
4A recipe (Pollack, 1986) is a template for performing
actions. It contains the applicability conditions for per-
forming an action, the subactions comprising the body
of an action, etc.
5Applicability conditions are conditions that must al-
ready be satisfied in order for an action to be reasonable
to pursue, whereas an agent can try to achieve unsatis-
fied preconditions.
6This subdialogue is considered an interrupt by Whit-
taker, Stenton, and Walker (Whittaker and Stenton,
1988; Walker and Whittaker, 1990), initiated to nego-
tiate the truth of a piece of information. However, the
utterances they classify as interrupts include not only our
negotiation subdialogues, generated for the purpose of
modifying a proposal, but also clarification subdialogues,
and information-sharing subdialogues (Chu-Carroll and
Carberry, 1995), which we contend should be part of the
evaluation process.
Action: Correct-Node( s1, s2, proposed)
Type: Decomposition
Appl Cond: believe( s1,¬acceptable( node))
believe( s2, acceptable( node))
Const: error-in-plan( node, proposed)
Body: Modify-Node( s1, s2, proposed, node)
Insert-Correction( s1, s2, proposed)
Goal: acceptable( proposed)
Action: Modify-Node( s1, s2, proposed, node)
Type: Specialization
Appl Cond: believe( s1,¬acceptable( node))
Precond: believe( s2,¬acceptable( node))
Body: Remove-Node( s1, s2, proposed, node)
Alter-Node( s1, s2, proposed, node)
Goal: modified( proposed)
Figure 2: The Correct-Node and Modify-Node
Recipes
vide evidence against the belief itself, address the
unaccepted evidence proposed by the user to elim-
inate the user’s justification for the belief, or both.
Since collaborative agents are expected to engage in
effective and efficient dialogues, the system should
address the unaccepted belief that it predicts will
most quickly resolve the top-level conflict. There-
fore, for each unaccepted top-level belief, our pro-
cess for selecting the focus of modification involves
two steps: identifying a candidate foci tree from the
proposed belief tree, and selecting a focus from the
candidate foci tree using the heuristic “attack the
belief(s) that will most likely resolve the conflict
about the top-level belief.” A candidate foci tree
contains the pieces of evidence in a proposed belief
tree which, if disbelieved by the user, might change
the user’s view of the unaccepted top-level proposed
belief (the root node of that belief tree). It is iden-
tified by performing a depth-first search on the pro-
posed belief tree. When a node is visited, both the
belief and the evidential relationship between it and
its parent are examined. If both the belief and rela-
tionship were accepted by the evaluator, the search
on the current branch will terminate, since once the
system accepts a belief, it is irrelevant whether it
accepts the user’s support for that belief (Young et
al., 1994). Otherwise, this piece of evidence will be
included in the candidate foci tree and the system
will continue to search through the evidence in the
belief tree proposed as support for the unaccepted
belief and/or evidential relationship.
Once a candidate foci tree is identified, the sys-
tem should select the focus of modification based on
the likelihood of each choice changing the user’s be-
lief about the top-level belief. Figure 3 shows our
algorithm for this selection process. Given an unac-
cepted belief ( bel) and the beliefs proposed to sup-
port it, Select-Focus-Modification will annotate
bel with 1) its focus of modification ( bel.focus),
which contains a set of beliefs ( bel and/or its de-
scendents) which, if disbelieved by the user, are pre-
dicted to cause him to disbelieve bel, and 2) the
system’s evidence against bel itself ( bel.s-attack).
Select-Focus-Modification deter-
mines whether to attack bel’s supporting evidence
separately, thereby eliminating the user’s reasons for
holding bel, to attack bel itself, or both. However,
in evaluating the effectiveness of attacking the pro-
posed evidence for bel, the system must determine
whether or not it is possible to successfully refute a
piece of evidence (i.e., whether or not the system be-
lieves that sufficient evidence is available to convince
the user that a piece of proposed evidence is invalid),
and if so, whether it is more effective to attack the
evidence itself or its support. Thus the algorithm
recursively applies itself to the evidence proposed as
support for bel which was not accepted by the sys-
tem (step 3). In this recursive process, the algorithm
annotates each unaccepted belief or evidential rela-
tionship proposed to support bel with its focus of
modification ( beli.focus) and the system’s evidence
against it ( beli.s-attack). beli.focus contains the
beliefs selected to be addressed in order to change
the user’s belief about beli, and its value will be
nil if the system predicts that insufficient evidence
is available to change the user’s belief about beli.
Based on the information obtained in step 3,
Select-Focus-Modification decides whether to at-
tack the evidence proposed to support bel, or bel
itself (step 4). Its preference is to address the unac-
cepted evidence, because McKeown’s focusing rules
suggest that continuing a newly introduced topic
(about which there is more to be said) is prefer-
able to returning to a previous topic (McKeown,
1985). Thus the algorithm first considers whether
or not attacking the user’s support for bel is suf-
ficient to convince him of ¬ bel (step 4.2). It does
so by gathering (in cand-set) evidence proposed by
the user as direct support for bel but which was
not accepted by the system and which the system
predicts it can successfully refute (i.e., beli.focus
is not nil). The algorithm then hypothesizes that
the user has changed his mind about each belief in
cand-set and predicts how this will affect the user’s
belief about bel (step 4.2). If the user is pre-
dicted to accept ¬ bel under this hypothesis, the
algorithm invokes Select-Min-Set to select a min-
imum subset of cand-set as the unaccepted beliefs
that it would actually pursue, and the focus of mod-
ification ( bel.focus) will be the union of the focus
for each of the beliefs in this minimum subset.
If attacking the evidence for bel does not appear
to be sufficient to convince the user of ¬ bel, the al-
gorithm checks whether directly attacking bel will
accomplish this goal. If providing evidence directly
against bel is predicted to be successful, then the
focus of modification is bel itself (step 4.3). If di-
rectly attacking bel is also predicted to fail, the al-
gorithm considers the effect of attacking both bel
and its unaccepted proposed evidence by combining
the previous two prediction processes (step 4.4). If
the combined evidence is still predicted to fail, the
system does not have sufficient evidence to change
the user’s view of bel; thus, the focus of modifica-
tion for bel is nil (step 4.5).7 Notice that steps 2 and
4 of the algorithm invoke a function, Predict, that
makes use of the belief revision mechanism (Galliers,
1992) discussed in Section 4.1 to predict the user’s
acceptance or unacceptance of bel based on the sys-
tem’s knowledge of the user’s beliefs and the evi-
dence that could be presented to him (Logan et al.,
1994). The result of Select-Focus-Modification
is a set of user beliefs (in bel.focus) that need to be
modified in order to change the user’s belief about
the unaccepted top-level belief. Thus, the negations
of these beliefs will be posted by the system as mu-
tual beliefs to be achieved in order to perform the
Modify actions.
4.2.2 Selecting Justification for a Claim
Studies in communication and social psychology
have shown that evidence improves the persuasive-
ness of a message (Luchok and McCroskey, 1978;
Reynolds and Burgoon, 1983; Petty and Cacioppo,
1984; Hample, 1985). Research on the quantity of
evidence indicates that there is no optimal amount
of evidence, but that the use of high-quality evi-
dence is consistent with persuasive effects (Reinard,
1988). On the other hand, Grice’s maxim of quan-
tity (Grice, 1975) specifies that one should not con-
tribute more information than is required.8 Thus, it
7In collaborative dialogues, an agent should reject a
proposal only if she has strong evidence against it. When
an agent does not have sufficient information to deter-
mine the acceptance of a proposal, she should initiate
an information-sharing subdialogue to share information
with the other agent and re-evaluate the proposal (Chu-
Carroll and Carberry, 1995). Thus, further research is
needed to determine whether or not the focus of modifi-
cation for a rejected belief will ever be nil in collaborative
dialogues.
8Walker (1994) has shown the importance of IRU’s
(Informationally Redundant Utterances) in efficient dis-
course. We leave including appropriate IRU’s for future
work.
is important that a collaborative agent selects suf-
ficient and effective, but not excessive, evidence to
justify an intended mutual belief.
To convince the user of a belief, bel, our system
selects appropriate justification by identifying beliefs
that could be used to support bel and applying fil-
tering heuristics to them. The system must first
determine whether justification for bel is needed by
predicting whether or not merely informing the user
of bel will be sufficient to convince him of bel. If so,
no justification will be presented. If justification is
predicted to be necessary, the system will first con-
struct the justification chains that could be used to
support bel. For each piece of evidence that could
be used to directly support bel, the system first
predicts whether the user will accept the evidence
without justification. If the user is predicted not to
accept a piece of evidence (evidi), the system will
augment the evidence to be presented to the user by
posting evidi as a mutual belief to be achieved, and
selecting propositions that could serve as justifica-
tion for it. This results in a recursive process that
returns a chain of belief justifications that could be
used to support bel.
Once a set of beliefs forming justification chains
is identified, the system must then select from this
set those belief chains which, when presented to the
user, are predicted to convince the user of bel. Our
system will first construct a singleton set for each
such justification chain and select the sets contain-
ing justification which, when presented, is predicted
to convince the user of bel. If no single justifica-
tion chain is predicted to be sufficient to change the
user’s beliefs, new sets will be constructed by com-
bining the single justification chains, and the selec-
tion process is repeated. This will produce a set
of possible candidate justification chains, and three
heuristics will then be applied to select from among
them. The first heuristic prefers evidence in which
the system is most confident since high-quality evi-
dence produces more attitude change than any other
evidence form (Luchok and McCroskey, 1978). Fur-
thermore, the system can better justify a belief in
which it has high confidence should the user not ac-
cept it. The second heuristic prefers evidence that is
novel to the user, since studies have shown that evi-
dence is most persuasive if it is previously unknown
to the hearer (Wyer, 1970; Morley, 1987). The third
heuristic is based on Grice’s maxim of quantity and
prefers justification chains that contain the fewest
beliefs.
4.2.3 Example
After the evaluation of the dialogue model in
Figure 1, Modify-Proposal is invoked because the
top-level proposed belief is not accepted. In se-
lecting the focus of modification, the system will
first identify the candidate foci tree and then in-
voke the Select-Focus-Modification algorithm on
the belief at the root node of the candidate foci
tree. The candidate foci tree will be identical to
the proposed belief tree in Figure 1 since both the
top-level proposed belief and its proposed evidence
were rejected during the evaluation process. This
indicates that the focus of modification could be
either ¬Teaches(Smith,AI) or On-Sabbatical(Smith,
next year) (since the evidential relationship be-
tween them was accepted). When Select-Focus-
Modification is applied to ¬Teaches(Smith,AI),
the algorithm will first be recursively invoked on
On-Sabbatical(Smith, next year) to determine the fo-
cus for modifying the child belief (step 3.1 in Fig-
ure 3). Since the system has two pieces of evi-
dence against On-Sabbatical(Smith, next year), 1) a
warranted piece of evidence containing Postponed-
Sabbatical(Smith,1997) and supports(Postponed-
Sabbatical(Smith,1997),¬On-Sabbatical(Smith, next
year)), and 2) a strong piece of
evidence containing ¬visitor(Smith,IBM,next year)
and supports(¬visitor(Smith,IBM,next year),¬On-
Sabbatical(Smith,next year)), the evidence is pre-
dicted to be sufficient to change the user’s be-
lief in On-Sabbatical(Smith,next year), and hence
¬Teaches(Smith,AI); thus, the focus of modifica-
tion will be On-Sabbatical(Smith,next year). The
Correct-Node specialization of Modify-Proposal will
be invoked since the focus of modification is
a belief, and in order to satisfy the precondi-
tion of Modify-Node (Figure 2), MB(S,U, ¬On-
Sabbatical(Smith,next year)) will be posted as a mu-
tual belief to be achieved.
Since the user has a warranted belief in On-
Sabbatical(Smith,next year) (indicated by the se-
mantic form of utterance (3)), the system will pre-
dict that merely informing the user of the intended
mutual belief is not sufficient to change his be-
lief; therefore it will select justification from the
two available pieces of evidence supporting ¬On-
Sabbatical(Smith,next year) presented earlier. The
system will predict that either piece of evidence
combined with the proposed mutual belief is suf-
ficient to change the user’s belief; thus, the fil-
tering heuristics are applied. The first heuris-
tic will cause the system to select Postponed-
Sabbatical(Smith, 1997) and supports(Postponed-
Sabbatical(Smith, 1997),¬On-Sabbatical(Smith, next
year)) as support, since it is the evidence in which
the system is more confident.
The system will try to establish the mutual be-
liefs9 as an attempt to satisfy the precondition of
Modify-Node. This will cause the system to invoke
Inform discourse actions to generate the following
utterances:
(4) S: Dr. Smith is not going on sabbatical
next year.
(5) He postponed his sabbatical until 1997.
If the user accepts the system’s utterances, thus sat-
isfying the precondition that the conflict be resolved,
Modify-Node can be performed and changes made to
the original proposed beliefs. Otherwise, the user
may propose modifications to the system’s proposed
modifications, resulting in an embedded negotiation
subdialogue.
5 Conclusion
This paper has presented a computational strategy
for engaging in collaborative negotiation to square
away conflicts in agents’ beliefs. The model cap-
tures features specific to collaborative negotiation.
It also supports effective and efficient dialogues by
identifying the focus of modification based on its
predicted success in resolving the conflict about the
top-level belief and by using heuristics motivated by
research in social psychology to select a set of evi-
dence to justify the proposed modification of beliefs.
Furthermore, by capturing collaborative negotiation
in a cycle of Propose-Evaluate-Modify actions, the
evaluation and modification processes can be applied
recursively to capture embedded negotiation subdi-
alogues.
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Select-Focus-Modification( bel):
1. bel.u-evid ← system’s beliefs about the user’s evi-
dence pertaining to bel
bel.s-attack ← system’s own evidence against bel
2. If bel is a leaf node in the candidate foci tree,
2.1 If Predict( bel, bel.u-evid + bel.s-attack) =
¬ bel
then bel.focus ← bel; return
2.2 Else bel.focus ← nil; return
3. Select focus for each of bel’s children in the candi-
date foci tree, bel1,. . ., beln:
3.1 If supports( beli, bel) is accepted but beli is
not, Select-Focus-Modification( beli).
3.2 Else
if beli is accepted but supports( beli, bel) is
not, Select-Focus-Modification( beli, bel).
3.3 Else Select-Focus-Modification( beli) and
Select-Focus-
Modification(supports( beli, bel))
4. Choose between attacking the proposed evidence
for bel and attacking bel itself:
4.1 cand-set ← { beli — beli ∈ unaccepted user
evidence for bel ∧ beli.focus 6= nil}
4.2 // Check if addressing bel’s unaccepted evi-
dence is sufficient
IfPredict( bel, bel.u-evid - cand-set) = ¬ bel
(i.e., the user’s disbelief in all unaccepted ev-
idence which the system can refute will cause
him to reject bel),
min-set ← Select-Min-Set( bel,cand-set)
bel.focus ←
⋃
beli∈ min-set
beli.focus
4.3 // Check if addressing bel itself is sufficient
Else if Predict( bel, bel.u-evid + bel.s-
attack) = ¬ bel (i.e., the system’s evidence
against bel will cause the user to reject bel),
bel.focus ← bel
4.4 // Check if addressing both bel and its unac-
cepted evidence is sufficient
Else if Predict( bel, bel.s-attack + bel.u-
evid - cand-set) = ¬ bel,
min-set ← Select-Min-Set( bel, cand-set +
bel)
bel.focus ←
⋃
beli∈ min-set
beli.focus ∪
bel
4.5 Else bel.focus ← nil
Figure 3: Selecting the Focus of Modification
